2024-03-29T01:39:14
112462
Fri Mar 29 01:39:15 EDT 2024
Replication data for: The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection
Roy Chen
Yan Chen
112462
https://doi.org/10.3886/E112462V1
When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination
game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)
C71 Cooperative Games
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations