2024-03-28T18:42:16
116802
Thu Mar 28 18:42:17 EDT 2024
Replication Data for: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions
Samuel Bazzi
Matthew Gudgeon
116802
https://doi.org/10.3886/E116802V1
We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit.
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
H41 Public Goods
H77 Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
Q34 Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
Indonesia