2024-03-29T05:31:06
117361
Fri Mar 29 05:31:07 EDT 2024
Code for: Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching
Atila Abdulkadiroglu
Yeon-Koo Che
Parag Pathak
Alvin Roth
Olivier Tercieux
117361
https://doi.org/10.3886/E117361V1
This folder contains the code for replication of Table 1 "Comparison of Mechanisms in New Orleans and Boston" in the American Economic Review: Insights paper titled "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching" by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag Pathak, Alvin Roth, and Olivier Tercieux.
school choice
top trading cycles
serial dictatorship
C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
D47 Market Design
D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
program source code