2024-03-29T06:00:18
119541
Fri Mar 29 06:00:19 EDT 2024
Data and Code for: Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study
Yan Chen
119541
https://doi.org/10.3886/E119541V1
This paper investigates a class of matching
problems—the assignment of indivisible items
to agents where some agents have prior claims
to some of the items. As a running example, we
will refer to the indivisible items as houses.
House allocation problems are not only of theoretical interest, but also of practical importance. A house allocation mechanism assigns a
set of houses (or offices, tasks, etc.) to prospective tenants, allotting at most one house to each
tenant. Rents are exogenously given and there is
no medium of exchange, such as money. In
general some houses will have existing tenants,
some houses will be empty, and some applicants for housing will be new (e.g., freshmen).
The canonical examples are assignment of college students to dormitory rooms and public
housing units. Other examples are assignment
of offices and tasks to individuals.
D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
R31 Housing Supply and Markets
R38 Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy
9/1999 – 9/2000