Metadata record for Data and Code For: Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent
111683
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
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V1
Data and Code For: Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent
111683
http://doi.org/10.3886/E111683V1
Nava Ashraf
Oriana Bandiera
Scott S. Lee
Edward Davenport
Please see full citation.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License.
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Lee, Scott S., and Davenport, Edward. Data and Code For: Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-04-15. https://doi.org/10.3886/E111683V1
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
J24 Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
M54 Labor Management
O15 Human Resources • Human Development • Income Distribution • Migration
D82
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new healthcare position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.
Zambia