Metadata record for Replication data for: Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya
113209
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
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V1
Replication data for: Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya
113209
http://doi.org/10.3886/E113209V1
Lorenzo Casaburi
Rocco Macchiavello
Please see full citation.
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Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
Casaburi, Lorenzo, and Macchiavello, Rocco. Replication data for: Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113209V1
K12 Contract Law
L66 Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits
O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Q12 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Q13 Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: (i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, (ii) poor contract enforcement, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments. We then present a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and test its additional predictions.